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This article summarizes the legal considerations that a court takes
into account as it strives toward a just determination of the best interests
of the child in a contested custody proceeding involving the child's
natural parents. As the title suggests, the modern child custody contest
usually entails more complex facets than were mentioned in the oft-
quoted Old Testament account of King Solomon's award of the custody
of an infant to its real mother.'
Although these additional considerations are designed to assist the
tribunal in arriving at a correct award of custody, they do not lessen the
dilemma that faces the court as it carefully weighs each case prior to
issuing an order favoring one natural parent over the other. This judge's
agony arises because, unlike many types of litigation that can be ap-
proached with considerable detachment, the child custody decision con-
fronts the judge with considerations that cannot easily be compiled and
coordinated. The judge must make a decision that will have an enormous
influence on the impressionable, developing child during his or her
formative years and may profoundly affect the lives of the parents.
To properly develop the theme of this article, the discussion of a
court's analysis of child custody considerations will be preceded by a
short history of the evolution of today's child custody law and followed
by a brief projection of the law's future development.
II. Evolution of the Law of Custody
After the advent of Pennsylvania's Equal Rights Amendment, many
of the traditional legal presumptions favoring one spouse over the other
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1. 1 Kings 3:23-27 (R.S.V.).
came under serious scrutiny. As a result of the challenges that were
brought before our courts, many inequitable presumptions have been
discarded and replaced by presumptions that apply uniformly to both
spouses in domestic relations cases.
2
The current enlightened approach toward equality of the sexes has
become the law, however, only after a long history of sex related
presumptions. During the growth of the Roman empire the private law
concept known as patria potestas (paternal power) blossomed. This
doctrine gave the father an absolute right to control his children. 3 Prior to
the flourishing of patria potestas in the Roman era, the concept of
paternal control of children was embedded in the laws of the Persian,
Egyptian, Greek, and Gallic empires.4
The father's control over his children continued beyond the demise
of the Roman empire and was incorporated into feudal English law. Since
the English law during the feudal period was primarily oriented toward
assuring an uninterrupted passage of title to property, child custody
followed the parent who was entitled to convey or bequeath property.
Thus, child custody rested almost exclusively with the male parent
property owner without regard for the child's needs.
5
It was not until 1660 that the English chancery courts inherited child
custody jurisdiction from the Court of Wards and Liveries, established
during the reign of Henry VIII. 6 Thereupon, the chancery courts began to
exercise a power of parens patriae, which permitted them, as an arm of
the sovereign, to assume a guardianship role over persons under a disabil-
ity. Notwithstanding their newly found interest in the child as an indi-
vidual rather than a chattel, the chancery courts' child custody awards
continued to favor the father, since he was usually the more financially
endowed parent in an age of male dominance over property.
This tendency toward male preference and female exclusion in child
custody matters was formally reversed in 1837 when Parliament passed
the British Infants' Custody Act. 7 This enactment entitled mothers of
legitimate children to periodical visitation with children in the father's
custody. The sponsor of the bill, Mr. Serjeant Talfourd, had convinced
his fellows that it was inequitable to prevent the mother of a legitimate
child from having contact with the child when mothers of illegitimate
children were awarded custody by the common law.
2. Butler v. Butler, 464 Pa. 522, 347 A.2d 477 (1975); Yohe v. Yohe, 466 Pa. 405,353
A.2d 417 (1976).
3. See Inker & Perretta, A Child's Right to Counsel in Custody Cases, 5 FAMILY
L.Q. 108, 109 (1971); Shepherd, Solomon's Sword: Adjudication of Child Custody Ques-
tions, 8 U. Ricic L. REv. 151, 161 (1974); Wilcox, A Child's Due Process Right to Counsel in
Divorce Custody Proceedings, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 917, 920 (1976).
4. See Hudak, The Plight of the Interstate Child in American Courts, 9 AKRON L.
REV. 257, 261 (1975).
5. See note 3 supra.
6. See Hudak, supra note 4, at 261.
7. Id.
Two years later, Parliament amended the British Infants' Custody
Act to permit a mother to petition the court for custody. In addition, the
amendment provided that if the subject child was under seven years of
age the proper custodial spouse was presumed to be the mother.8 Delivery
of the child to the mother was enforceable by an action for contempt.
The abruptness of this statutory departure from the common law is
accentuated by the fact that the statutory preference for the mother could
only be defeated by proof that she had been convicted of adultery, either
in an action for criminal conversation9 brought by her husband, or by a
similar conviction in an ecclesiastical court.10 A further amendment in
1873 to the British Infants' Custody Act permitted the mother to retain
possession of her children through their age of sixteen years. 1'
As statutorily modified, this concept of parenspatriae was incorpo-
rated into the American law as a natural incident of our colonial ties with
England. Its original purpose, the protection of tenurial rights and the
exercise of the sovereign's prerogatives, clearly have no current rele-
vance. It was through this parens patriae concept, though, that the
modern concept of the "best interests" rule evolved.
Although many professional articles credit Justice Cardozo with first
articulating the "best interests" rule in the 1925 decision of Finlay v.
Finlay, 12 courts in several prior cases had employed the "best interests of
the child" concept. In 1910, for example, the Colorado Supreme Court
adopted language and rationale that referred to the interest and welfare of
the child. 13 In 1897, the Supreme Court of Connecticut held, in a
proceeding for child custody, that the principal consideration must be the
best interests of the child.' 4 In 1881, the Supreme Court of Kansas
pronounced that the promotion of the child's welfare and interests was of
paramount importance. 1 In 1824, a Rhode Island case alluded to the real,
permanent interests of the infant.' 6 The earliest reference in American
case law to the child's best interests appears to be a Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania decision by Chief Justice Tilghman in 1813, in which the
court focused on the child's healthy environment rather than upon the
mother's reputation. 1
7
8. British Infants Custody Act, 1839, 2 & 3 Vict., c. 54; also Hudak, supra note 4, at
262.
9. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recently abrogated the common law action of
criminal conversation in Fadgen v. Lenkner, -Pa.-, 365 A.2d 147 (1976).
10. Hudak, supra note 4, at 262.
11. British Infants Custody Act of 1873, 36 & 37 Vict., c. 12.
12. 240 N.Y. 429, 148 N.E. 624 (1925).
13. Wilson v. Mitchell, 48 Colo. 454, 111 P. 21 (1910).
14. Kelsey v. Green, 69 Conn. 291, 37 A. 679 (1897).
15. Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Kan. 650, 40 Am. R. 321 (1881).
16. United States v. Green, 26 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.D.R.I. 1824).
17. Commonwealth v. Addicks, 5 Binn. 520 (Pa. 1813).
III. Ascertaining the Child's Best Interests
In all disputes between a father and mother contesting which parent,
if either, should be entitled to a minor child's custody, subject to a right
of visitation in the other, the court's paramount concern should be the
best interests and permanent welfare of the child. 18 The child's welfare
has been variously identified by appellate courts as the cardinal, 19 over-
riding ,20 and predominant consideration 2' to which the court must address
itself. In comparision, all other factors in a custody proceeding assume a
subordinate position.
22
Incorporated into the "best interests" concept are considerations
relating to the child's physical, intellectual, moral, and spiritual well
being. 23 These considerations, in turn, require a court to focus upon such
circumstances as the stability of the home life offered by those who
contend for the child's custody, the companionship of siblings and other
children, the attitudes and reasonableness of the contending parents, and,
to a degree, the preference of the child and the possibility of the child's
removal from the court's jurisdiction. Thus, the court is required to
employ a totality of the circumstances test when it adjudicates a child
custody matter. The individual ingredients of the totality of the circum-
stances concept will be discussed seriatim.
A. Parental Competence, Character, and Conduct
In a dispute between a father and a mother for the custody of their
child, the court must focus upon the parents' fitness, since this will
certainly have a significant impact upon the child's best interests and
permanent welfare. 24 Although there is no fixed rule that a parent is
entitled to custody merely because he or she is competent and of good
moral character, 25 parental fitness serves as a valid and predictable
indicator of the child's future environment. Thus, the issue relates
primarily to present fitness and not past misconduct, although past be-
18. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 91 (1965), as modified by PA. RULE CIV. PROC. 2250(5);
Commonwealth ex rel. Tucker v. Salinger, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 366 A.2d 286 (1976).
19. Commonwealth ex rel. Rogers v. Daven, 298 Pa. 416, 148 A. 524 (1930).
20. Commonwehlth ex reL. Cleary v. Weaver, 188 Pa. Super. Ct. 197, 146 A.2d 374
(1958).
21. Commonwealth ex reL Rainford v. Cirillo, 222 Pa. Super. Ct. 591, 296 A.2d 838
(1972).
22. Id.; Commonwealth ex rel. Carpenter v. Carpenter, 189 Pa. Super. Ct. 297, 150
A.2d 724 (1959); Commonwealth ex rel. Shaak v. Shaak, 171 Pa. Super. Ct. 122, 90 A.2d 270
(1952).
23. Commonwealth ex rel. Lovell v. Shaw, 202 Pa. Super. Ct. 339, 195 A.2d 878
(1963); Commonwealth ex rel. Bordlemay v. Bordlemay, 201 Pa. Super, Ct. 435, 193 A.2d
845 (1963).
24. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 92 (1965); Davidyan v. Davidyan, 230 Pa. Super. Ct. 599,
327 A.2d 145 (1974).
25. Commonwealth ex rel. Boschert v. Cook, 122 Pa. Super. Ct. 397, 186 A. 229
(1936).
havior may be considered in determining a parent's probable future
actions. 26
Additionally, a determination must be made whether the parent's
misconduct affected the welfare of the children.27 If it did, and if it was
persistent and flagrant, the parent's right to custody may be forfeited.28
Improper conduct detrimental to a child's welfare may even negate the
presumptive custodial right in the mother of a child of tender years.
29
Lapses in moral conduct by a parent, even if they involve adultery,
30
are not necessarily controlling if the parent is not otherwise at fault. 3
Unless it can be shown that the mother's cohabitation with a male friend
is detrimental to the welfare of the child, custody will not be refused.32
In weighing the parents' comparative competence, character, and
conduct, a court occasionally faces a situation in which both parties are
equally guilty of misconduct. Just such a case was presented to the
Pennsylvania Superior Court, which held that custody would not be taken
from a divorced mother who was guilty of acts of fornication, since the
father was guilty of similar conduct. The court found the parents in pari
delicto and refused to recognize a double standard that would have given
the father custody. 33 Generally, though, child custody will be determined
on other grounds when the record discloses undesirable conduct on the
part of both parents. 
34
A mother is not to be deprived of custody of her child of tender years
merely because she is compelled to work for a living, provided there is
adequate supervision of the child during her absence. 35 Abandonment,
though, will constitute grounds for relinquishment of custody rights. To
establish abandonment, it must be shown that a parent exhibited a settled
intent to relinquish all parental claims to the child. This intent is ordinar-
ily evidenced by words or acts revealing a positive intent to perform no
parental duties and exercise no further claim.
36
26. Augustine v. Augustine, 228 Pa. Super. Ct. 312, 324 A.2d 477 (1974).
27. Commonwealth ex rel. Keer v. Cress, 194 Pa. Super. Ct. 529, 168 A.2d 788 (1961).
28. Id.; In re Snellgrose, 432 Pa. 158, 247 A.2d 596 (1968).
29. Commonwealth ex rel. Rainford v. Cirillo, 222 Pa. Super. Ct. 591, 296 A.2d 838
(1972).
30. Commonwealth ex rel. Lovell v. Shaw, 202 Pa. Super. Ct. 339, 195 A.2d 878
(1963); Commonwealth ex rel. Wert v. Long, 196 Pa. Super, Ct. 632, 175 A.2d 887 (1961);
Commonwealth ex rel. Logue v. Logue, 194 Pa. Super. Ct. 210, 166 A.2d 60 (1960);
Commonwealth ex rel. Mann v. Mann, 181 Pa. Super. Ct. 438, 124 A.2d 432 (1956);
Commonwealth ex rel. Martocello v. Martocello, 148 Pa. Super. Ct. 562, 25 A.2d 855 (1942).
31. Commonwealth ex rel. Logue v. Logue, 194 Pa. Super. Ct. 210, 166 A.2d 60
(1961); Commonwealth ex rel. Lovell v. Shaw, 202 Pa. Super. Ct. 339, 195 A.2d 878 (1963).
32. Commonwealth ex rel. Myers v. Myers, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 360 A.2d 587 (1976);
Gunter v. Gunter, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 361 A.2d 307 (1976); Commonwealth ex rel. Shipp v.
Shipp, 209 Pa. Super. Ct. 58, 223 A.2d 906 (1966).
33. Commonwealth ex rel. Ackerman v. Ackerman, 204 Pa. Super. Ct. 403, 205 A.2d
49 (1964).
34. Commonwealth ex rel. Spriggs v. Carson, 229 Pa. Super. Ct. 9, 323 A.2d 273
(1974).
35. Commonwealth ex rel. Holschuh v. Holland-Moritz, 448 Pa. 437, 292 A.2d 380
(1972).
36. Auman v. Eash, 228 Pa. Super. Ct. 242, 323 A.2d 94 (1974).
Since the present fitness of the parent is the critical focal point,
rehabilitation and reform are recognized in custody law. When reforma-
tion and departure from past misconduct are proved, a parent may not be
deprived of a child's custody on the sole ground of past behavior." Thus,
a parent may be awarded custody of a child upon a sufficiently convinc-
ing showing that he or she has recovered from a debilitating drug addic-
tion and is currently competent to care for the child. 38 Similarly, recovery
from a previous mental disability removes a bar to child custody,
39
particularly in light of a promising prognosis.
40
B. The Child's Age, Sex, and Preference
A second circumstance that should be considered by a court deciding
a child custody case is the age and sex of the child, since this element may
bear significantly upon the child's best interest and welfare.4 ' This con-
sideration must not be given undue emphasis,42 however, in view of the
totality of the circumstances concept.
Consideration of the child's age, relative to the "tender years"
doctrine,4 3 is of greater significance to the custody determination than is
consideration of the child's sex. A decision respecting an infant's custo-
dial well-being may be reached on the basis of age when the other factual
considerations do not dictate a different result." A strong, 45 prima
37. Commonwealth ex rel. Grillo v. Shuster, 226 Pa. Super. Ct. 229, 312 A.2d 58
(1973).
38. Commonwealth ex rel. Jacobson v. Jacobson, 181 Pa. Super. Ct. 369, 124 A.2d 462
(1956).
39. Commonwealth ex reL. Edinger v. Edinger, 374 Pa. 586, 98 A.2d 172 (1953),
40. Commonwealth ex reL Beishline v. Beishline, 176 Pa. Super. Ct. 231, 107 A.2d 580
(1954).
41. See Commonwealth ex rel. Doberstein v. Doberstein, 201 Pa. Super. Ct. 102, 192
A.2d 154 (1963).
42. Commonwealth ex rel. Pruss v. Pruss, 236 Pa. Super. Ct. 247, 344 A.2d 509 (1975);
Commonwealth ex rel. McLeod v. Seiple, 193 Pa. Super. Ct. 131, 163 A.2d 912 (1960).
43. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently rendered a decision in which the "ten-
der years" presumption was severely restricted in scope. The relevant language of the
decision is as follows:
We also question the legitimacy of a doctrine that is predicted upon tradition-
al or stereotypic roles of men and women in a marital union. Whether the tender
years doctrine is employed to create a presumption which requires the male
parent to overcome its effect by presenting compelling contrary evidence of a
particular nature; (citations deleted) or merely as a makeshift where the scales are
relatively balanced; (citations deleted) such a view is offensive to the concept of
the equality of the sexes which we have embraced as a constitutional principle
within this jurisdiction. See PA. CONST., art. I, § 28. Courts should be wary of
deciding matters as sensitive as questions of custody by the invocation of "pre-
sumptions." Instead, we believe that our courts should inquire into the circum-
stances and relationships of all the parties involved and reach a determination
based solely upon the facts of the case then before the court.
Commonwealth ex rel. Spriggs v. Carson, - Pa. -, -, 368 A.2d 635, 639-40 (1977).
44. Commonwealth ex rel. Steuer v. Steuer, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 368 A.2d 732 (1976);
Commonwealth ex. reL Ulmer v. Ulmer, 231 Pa. Super. Ct. 144, 331 A.2d 665 (1974).
45. Commonwealth ex rel. Sissel v. Sciulli, 216 Pa. Super. Ct. 429, 268 A.2d 165
(1970); Commonwealth ex reL. Hickey v. Hickey, 213 Pa. Super. Ct. 349, 247 A.2d 806
(1968).
facie,46 albeit rebuttable47 presumption favors granting the mother of a
young child custody if she is fit,48 even though the child's father may be
able to furnish a superior physical environment for the child.49 Compel-
ling reasons must be evident in the record to overcome the presumption
that a child's best interests ordinarily will be served by the mother50 until
the child attains an age of about fourteen years, 51 especially when the
child is a girl.52
Even though the law presumes that a child of tender years will
usually be best served by the mother, this presumption does not rise to the
level of a right in the mother. Since the mother's interest is not absolute,
it must yield to the paramount consideration of the child's best interests
and welfare. Thus, this presumption should not be carried further than the
circumstances of a particular case require. 
53
To temper the "tender years" doctrine on a case-by-case basis, a
court can consider the expressed preferences of the child. The weight of
the child's preference will be determined by the trial judge54 in light of the
child's age, intelligence, and maturity. 55 The younger the child, the
greater the preference for the mother's interest under the "tender years"
doctrine, the child's express wishes to the contrary notwithstanding.
Thus, a four-year-old child's expressed desire to be with the father has
been ruled not to be controlling. 56 Similarly, the stated preference of an
eight-year-old child for the father, which stemmed from the child's
familiarity with the neighborhood and consequent proximity to his
friends, was not dispositive.57
As the child's age increases, assuming corresponding normal mental
development, the child's preference is accorded greater importance.
Thus, in In re Custody of Carlisle, a trial court was found not to have
46. Commonwealth ex. rel. Ackerman v. Ackerman, 204 Pa. Super. Ct. 403, 205 A.2d
49 (1964).
47. Commonwealth ex rel. Foster v. Foster, 225 Pa. Super. Ct. 436, 311 A.2d 663
(1973); Commonwealth ex rel. Davis v. Davis, 97 Pa. Super. Ct. 442 (1929).
48. Williams v. Williams, 223 Pa. Super. Ct. 29, 296 A.2d 870 (1972).
49. Commonwealth ex rel. Holshuh v. Holland-Moritz, 448 Pa. 437, 292 A.2d 380
(1972); Commonwealth ex rel. Cooper v. Cooper, 167 Pa. Super. Ct. 492, 75 A.2d 609 (1950).
50. In re Russo, 237 Pa. Super. Ct. 80, 346 A.2d 355 (1975); Commonwealth ex rel.
Parikh v. Parikh, 219 Pa. Super. Ct. 240, 280 A.2d 621 (1971), rev. on other grounds, 449 Pa.
105, 296 A.2d 625 (1972).
51. Williams v. Williams, 223 Pa. Super. Ct. 29, 296 A.2d 870 (1972); Commonwealth
ex rel. Skurat v. Gearhart, 178 Pa. Super. Ct. 245, 115 A.2d 395 (1955).
52. Commonwealth ex reL. Shipp v. Shipp, 209 Pa. Super. Ct. 58, 223 A.2d 906 (1966);
Commonwealth ex rel. Horton v. Burke, 190 Pa. Super. Ct. 392, 154 A.2d 255 (1959).
53. Commonwealth ex rel. Buell v. Buell, 186 Pa. Super. Ct. 468,142 A.2d 338 (1958).
54. Commonwealth ex rel. Doberstein v. Doberstein, 201 Pa. Super. Ct. 102, 192 A.2d
154 (1963).
55. Id.; Commonwealth ex rel. Bender v. Bender, 197 Pa. Super. Ct. 397, 178 A.2d
779 (1962).
56. Commonwealth ex rel. Maines v. McCandless, 175 Pa. Super. Ct. 157, 103 A.2d
480 (1954).
57. Commonwealth ex rel. Barsden v. DeMarco, 215 Pa. Super. Ct. 38, 257 A.2d 365
(1969).
abused its discretion by deciding a custody proceeding in a father's favor
when the children, aged twelve and thirteen years, expressed such a
desire. In that case, although the father had remarried and was living in
the home occupied by the family prior to separation, the mother had not
remarried and had repeatedly threatened to relocate as a means of enforc-
ing discipline.
5 8
Although the stated preferences of children aged twelve, thirteen,
and fourteen years can outweigh the "tender years" doctrine under
proper circumstances, 9 mere age is not the controlling factor. The sub-
ject child must also evidence the requisite mental growth and maturity.
Thus, a teenager's wishes should not be considered if they are based upon
whim 6r constitute an attempt to avoid parental discipline. Similarly, if a
twelve-year-old girl is slow and perhaps retarded, the best interests of the
child may require her to be in her mother's custody despite her expression
of preference for her father. 6° Again, it is the child's physical, intellectu-
al, spiritual, and emotional well-being upon which the court must focus;
all conflicting considerations, including the "tender years" doctrine and
child preferences, must be subordinate.
61
C. Separation of Siblings
In determining the custody of children who have siblings, a court
must also address itself to the advisability of separating the children. In
this regard, Pennsylvania law provides that it is prima facie desirable to
have all the children of the same parents reared together as a family,62 and
that brother and sister should be separated only for good reason.
63
This policy of keeping siblings together is not a fixed or absolute
rule. 64 As is the case with all child custody considerations, this policy
must yield to a determination of the best interests of the individual
child. 65 Thus, as the older children in a family become sufficiently mature
to express legitimate custodial preferences, circumstances may warrant
separation from younger siblings. In such a case, the detrimental effects
on a child who prefers not to live with a particular parent may outweigh
58. In re Custody of Carlisle, 225 Pa. Super. Ct. 181, 310 A.2d 280 (1973).
59. Id.; In re Custody of Clair, 219 Pa. Super. Ct. 436, 281 A.2d 726 (1971).
60. Commonwealth ex rel. Hickey v. Hickey, 213 Pa. Super. Ct. 349, 247 A.2d 806
(1968).
61. In re Russo, 237 Pa. Super. Ct. 80, 346 A.2d 355 (1975).
62. Commonwealth ex rel. Doberstein v. Doberstein, 201 Pa. Super. Ct. 102, 192 A.2d
154 (1963); Commonwealth ex rel. Dinsmore v. Dinsmore, 198 Pa. Super. Ct. 480, 182 A.2d
66 (1962).
63. Commonwealth ex rel. Steuer v. Steuer, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 368 A.2d 732 (1976);
Commonwealth ex rel. Bowser v. Bowser, 224 Pa. Super. Ct. 1, 302 A.2d 450 (1973);
Commonwealth ex rel. Sissel v. Sciulli, 216 Pa. Super. Ct. 429, 268 A.2d 165 (1970);
Commonwealth ex rel. Traeger v. Ritting, 206 Pa. Super. Ct. 446, 213 A.2d 681 (1965);
Commonwealth ex rel. Martino v. Blough, 201 Pa. Super. Ct. 346, 191 A.2d 918 (1963).
64. In re Snellgrose, 432 Pa. 158, 247 A.2d 596 (1968).
65. In re Russo, 237 Pa. Super. Ct. 80, 346 A.2d 355 (1975).
the benefits of compelling the child to reside with that parent solely to
keep siblings together.
66
Similarly, the policy of keeping children together, standing alone,
would not necessarily overcome the need of a young child for its
mother. 67 Thus it is evident that this general policy against separating
siblings is closely intertwined with the previously discussed considera-
tions of age, sex, and preference of the children. A tribunal must assess
the total circumstances and carefully decide whether to keep siblings
together, in an attempt to ascertain each child's best interests.
D. Religious Training and Convictions
The proper religious training of a child is an important matter that
should be considered by a court when it decides which parent should be
awarded custody.68 Religion does not determine custody, however, and
must be viewed in conjunction with all the other considerations that bear
upon a child's best interests. 69 In this regard, it has been held that a court
cannot morally condemn sending a four-year-old boy of Jewish parentage
to a Methodist Sunday School in the absence of a contractual agreement
between the parents that the child would be reared in the Jewish faith. The
maintenance of the boy's Jewish faith would not require the taking of
custody from his mother merely because she had abandoned Judaism after
the divorce.
70
IV. Ascertaining the Authority to Adjudicate
Prior to receiving testimony in a custody case, the court must focus
its attention on matters of jurisdiction and venue. Although the words
"venue" and "jurisdiction" are often carelessly interchanged, it is im-
portant to note their distinction. Jurisdiction refers to the competence of a
court to determine controversies of the general class to which a particular
case belongs and to bind the parties to the litigation by its judgment.
71
Venue relates to the place in which a particular action is to be brought and
is primarily determined by the convenience of the litigants. 72
An objection to the lack of subject matter jurisdiction can never be
waived and may be raised at any time during the proceedings by the
parties or by the court sua sponte. 73 A challenge to venue must be timely
66. Id.
67. Commonwealth exrel. Shipp v. Shipp, 209Pa. Super. Ct.. 58, 223 A.2d 906 (1966).
68. Commonwealth ex rel. Bordlemay v. Bordlemay, 201 Pa. Super. Ct. 435, 193 A.2d
845 (1963); Commonwealth exrel. Stack v. Stack, 141 Pa. Super. Ct. 147, 15 A.2d 76 (1940).
69. Commonwealth ex rel. Trott v. Wilcox, 118 Pa. Super, Ct. 363, 179 A. 808 (1935);
Commonwealth ex rel. Kelley v. Kelley, 83 Pa. Super. Ct. 17 (1924).
70. Commonwealth ex rel. Ackerman v. Ackerman, 204 Pa. Super. Ct. 403, 205 A.2d
49 (1964).
71. County Constr. Co. v. Levengood Constr. Co., 393 Pa. 39, 142 A.2d 9 (1958).
72. Id.
73. Commonwealth v. Little, 455 Pa. 163, 314 A.2d 270 (1974); Bloom v. Bloom, 238
Pa. Super. Ct. 246, 362 A.2d 1024 (1976); Commonwealth ex rel. Soloff v. Soloff, 215 Pa.
Super. Ct. 328, 257 A.2d 314 (1969).
raised by preliminary objection; otherwise it is deemed to have been
waived. 74
Jurisdiction in child custody cases follows either the domicile or the
residence of the child. 75 The decisions that have promulgated this rule
rely upon section 79 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws,
76
which sets forth three areas in which a court may exercise jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the court has jurisdiction when the child is (a) domiciled in
the state, or (b) present in the state, or (c) neither domiciled nor present in
the state, if the controversy is between two or more persons who are
personally subject to the jurisdiction of the state.
Pennsylvania courts have held that the mere presence of the child
within the court's jurisdiction, regardless of the length of time, is suffi-
cient to confer jurisdiction. 77 That the child has been enticed into the local
judicial district by some ruse or in violation of a prior court order is
immaterial. Harsh as it may seem, the means of obtaining possession of
the child is insignificant in determining jurisdiction. 78 Wrongful conduct
would, however, have a bearing upon one's fitness to retain or receive
custody.
79
When there has been a prior adjudication of custody, further custody
litigation frequently arises through a habeas corpus proceeding 80 Before
a court in a particular judicial district has power to determine whether a
writ of habeas corpus should issue, the child must be confined in that
district or be restrained and controlled by an adult within that district. 81 In
the latter event, the child need not be physically present within the
geographical boundaries of the judicial district.
82
V. Recent Trends
This portion of the article is intended to focus the reader's thoughts
upon several considerations that have not yet become the subject of many
court decisions but that deserve the best thoughts of legal practitioners
and those who develop legislative policies.
74. PA. R. Civ. P. 1006(e).
75. Commonwealth ex rel. Graham v. Graham, 367 Pa. 553, 80 A.2d 829 (1951);
Commonwealth ex rel. Hickey v. Hickey, 216 Pa. Super. Ct. 332, 264 A.2d 420 (1970);
Swigart v. Swigart, 193 Pa. Super. Ct. 174, 163 A.2d 716 (1960); Commonwealth ex rel.
Camp v. Camp, 150 Pa. Super. Ct. 649, 29 A.2d 363 (1942).
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 79 (1970).
77. Commonwealth ex ret. Graham v. Graham, 367 Pa. 553, 80 A.2d 829 (1951).
78. Reilly v. Reilly, 219 Pa. Super. Ct. 85, 280 A.2d 639 (1971); In re Custody of
Irizarry, 195 Pa. Super. Ct. 104, 169 A.2d 307 (1961).
79. Commonwealth ex rel. Rogers v. Daven, 298 Pa. 416, 148 A. 524 (1930); Common-
wealth ex rel. Schofield v. Schofield, 173 Pa. Super. Ct. 631, 98 A.2d 437 (1953).
80. See PA. STAT. ANN tit. 12, § 1901 (1967).
81. Commonwealth ex ret. Mees v. Mathieu, 107 Pa. Super. Ct. 261, 163 A. 109 (1932);
Reilly v. Reilly, 219 Pa. Super. Ct. 85, 280 A.2d 639 (1971).
82. Commonwealth ex. rel. Hickey v. Hickey, 216 Pa. Super. Ct. 332, 264 A.2d 420
(1970). For a thorough dissertation on the matter of jurisdiction in child custody cases, see
Commonwealth ex ret. Blank v. Rutledge, 234 Pa. Super. Ct. 339, 339 A.2d 71 (1975).
A. Legal Representation for the Child
One of the most widespread movements in the developing law of
child custody is the advocacy of legal representation for the child in
contested custody cases. Often the impetus for developments in the law
derives from a case in which tragedy suggests that precautions be adopted
to avert similar future recurrences. Just such a case arose recently in New
Jersey in which drug addicted parents gave birth to an addicted child. The
state removed the child from their custody, and the parents made progress
toward overcoming their addiction. Subsequently the parents petitioned
to have their child returned, and the court consented. Tragically, the child
was dead within one month of its return.
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Although this case is not unique, it fortunately does not represent the
majority of child custody cases. Nevertheless, it is this type of case in
which tragedy was not thwarted that prompts serious questions: Could the
presence of counsel for the child have previously identified the potential
for disaster and prevented tradgedy? Could counsel for the child have
independently adduced critical information about the character of the
contesting parents and thereby blocked the parents from convincing the
tribunal that their custody would serve the best interests of the child? If
we move one logical step further more fundamental questions are raised:
Are there significant numbers of contested custody cases that entail
otherwise undisclosed, potentially damaging tendencies by a parent that
should preclude custody? Is it advisable to establish a policy whereby the
subject children of contested custody cases would automatically have
appointed counsel?
As previously indicated, such questions do not lend themselves to
quick, uncomplicated answers. Those jurisdictions that have addressed
the subject have generally taken the view that it is necessary to recognize
the minor child as an indispensable rather than a nominal party in a
contested custody proceeding. The tribunal may either appoint an attor-
ney to represent the child 84 or notify the state's prosecuting attorney to
become the child's advocate. s5 Other jurisdictions have granted the courts
discretionary, as opposed to mandatory, power to appoint counsel for the
child.
8 6
83. See Comment, A Child's Right to Independent Counsel in Custody Proceedings:
Providing Effective "Best Interests" Determiniation Through the Use of a Legal Advocate, 6
SETON HALL L. REV. 303 (1975).
84. Id.; Skubas v. Skubas, 31 Conn. 340, 330 A.2d 105 (1974); Ford v. Ford, .191 Neb.
548, 216 N.W.2d 176 (1974); State ex rel. Juvenile Dep't of Multnomah County v. Wade, 527
P.2d 753 (Or. App. 1974); Edwards v. Edwards, 270 Wis. 48, 71 N.W.2d 366 (1955).
85. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 25.121 (1974).
86. Barth v. Barth, 12 Ohio Misc. 141, 225 N.E.2d 866 (1967); Zunni v. Zunni, 103 R.I.
417, 238 A.2d 373 (1968); Aitz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-321 (1976); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
14-10-116 (1973); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.12 (Supp. 1976); UTAH CODE ANN- § 30-3-11.2
(Supp. 1975); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 594 (1974).
The underlying premise of those who advocate counsel for the child
is that the child's "best interests" are difficult to discern from the biased
evidence that is produced by contesting parents as they attempt to dis-
credit each other before the court in a highly volatile and emotional
proceeding. Thus, counsel for the child would assist the court in prevent-
ing the custody contest from deteriorating to a legal war between the
parents, in which the child becomes a prize for the victor in the struggle
for self-justification or revenge. Child counsel advocates also assert that it
is unrealistic to think that the parents' attorneys can or will effectively
advocate the child's interests. Particular emphasis is placed upon those
instances in which a parent's attorney is faced with the realization that his
client's desires and the child's "best interests" are not compatible. In
such circumstances, the presence of counsel for the child is necessary to
enable the parents' counsel to fully comply with the ABA Code of
Professional Responsiblity, DR 5-101A and DR 5-105(c). 87
Separate representation of children in contested custody matters
could provide the child with the same rights to discovery, presentation of
evidence, cross-examination, and appellate review that the adult pos-
sesses. The interests of the child that could be assured by separate counsel
include: (1) having the case progress through the procedural stages of
litigation rapidly to expedite a final decision; (2) preventing frivolous
appeals; (3) marshalling supportive facts and articulating the child's
desires effectively; (4) classifying monies as support rather than alimony,
thereby limiting the custodial parent's discretion regarding its usage; (5)
protecting support monies 'in the event of remarriage; (6) bringing actions
to compel medical treatment or to reject the same if nonessential; (7)
preventing a parent from successfully seeking custody of an antipathetic
child in order to exert influence over the parent seeking visitation arrange-
ments; (8) preventing a spouse from successfully seeking custody as a
bargaining tool to reduce child support or alimony demands; and (9)
preventing a parent from seeking custody as vindication of his or her
innocence in the breakup of the marriage.
Although the foregoing considerations in favor of counsel for the
child are enticing, there are persuasive countervailing considerations.
One argument against the automatic appointment of counsel for the child
is that additional expense will flow to the adult litigants. This expense
consideration might also be compounded by the potential protraction of
litigation because of the presence of a third counsel. The second argument
recognizes that rather than assure rapid resolution of the controversy, as
contended by supporters of counsel for the child, additional counsel may
prolong litigation.
87. See Genden, Separate Legal Representation for Children: Protecting the Rights
and Interests of Minors in Judicial Proceedings, I I HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 565 (1976).
A third point advanced by those who oppose counsel is the allegedly
inherent limitation of the effectiveness of counsel because of the charac-
teristics of the children. Since children view the world through immature,
inexperienced eyes, their preferences may lack perception of their own
"best interests." The younger the child, the more accentuated will be his
or her inability to assist counsel in developing a viable perspective that a
court could accept.
Finally, the opponents of counsel argue that a potential conflict of
interest between the adult's objectives in the litigation and the child's
"best interests" is not a sufficiently significant consideration to warrant
automatic child counsel. They contend that if a hint of conflict appears in
a case, counsel could identify.and disclose this possibility to the parent
and to the child and carefully determine whether the child understands the
problem and voluntarily consents to dual representation. If an actual
conflict were to arise, counsel for the adult should request the appoint-
ment of counsel for the child.
Similarly, counsel could be requested in cases in which a child has
distinct personal interests in the preservation of the court's decision that
transcend the interests perceived by the adult litigant. Just such a situation
recently confronted this author in a case contesting paternity. When an
appeal was taken from the jury's determination of paternity, counsel for
the mother moved that independent counsel for the child be appointed for
the appellate phases of the case. The mother had a significant interest in
the preservation of the jury verdict because of her demand for support
payments for the child. The court nevertheless entered an order appoint-
ing counsel for the child in view of the child's interest in preserving the
decision to protect his entitlement for welfare, social security, and sup-
port payments and his standing for wrongful death, workmen's compen-
sation, and inheritance claims.
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B. Full Faith and Credit
Both counsel and the court exert considerable effort to acheive an
adjudication that will serve the "best interests" of a child. Attention must
also be directed toward minimizing the "'seize-run-sue" syndrome that
frequently prompts unsuccessful litigants to flee with a child to another
forum to seek a more favorable custody adjudication. Since the "best
interests" of a child are generally served by a stable environment, such
practices contribute little to the proper development of the child.
Previous court efforts to limit the "seize-run-sue" syndrome have
included: (1) absolute denials of visitation out-of-state, since travel ex-
penses between two points are the same whether the visitor comes into the
88. Matthews v. Cuff, Court of Common Pleas, Allegheny County, Pa., Family
Division, No. 120 of 1975 (per Brosky, J.) (currently on appeal to Superior Court of
Pennsylvania at 149 April Term, 1977).
jurisdiction or the child travels to the non-custodial, out-of-state parent;
(2) the posting of compliance bonds to assure the child's return; and (3)
employment of the clean hands doctrine, under which a tribunal can
refuse to entertain an action if the child has been brought into the forum in
violation of the decree of a sister state. Nevertheless, all of these efforts,
even though well-intentioned, are weak in comparison to the syndrome
which they seek to remedy.
An absolute denial of out-of-state visitation is vulnerable to several
arguments. First, a child needs the love, affection, and companionship of
both parents. Second, it is not always as economically feasible for a
parent to travel to a jurisdiction as it is for a child to visit with the
noncustodial parent, since travel fares for adults generally exceed chil-
dren's fares. Furthermore, parents must often incur additional costs by
leaving their place of employment or business establishment to undertake
the visitation. The noncustodial parents may also be unable to temporarily
forego responsibilities to others who are now dependent upon them.
Compliance bonds have not proved to be the solution either. Their
principal defect is that they must be set so high that they exceed the
economic reach of the noncustodial parent. Were they within the reach of
the noncustodial parent, then they would prove insufficient to satisfy
detective and attorneys' fees if the child were not returned.
Nor can a court, without identifying a legitimate state interest,
condition an award of child custody on a requirement that the custodial
parent not leave the jurisdiction xith the child. Although the United
States Constitution does not expressly guarantee a right to travel, a
prohibition on travel would violate the implied constitutional right to
travel that the Supreme Court has long recognized as emanating from the
privilege and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment, the
privilege and immunities clause of article IV, the commerce clause of
article I, and the due process clause of the fifth amendment. 89
Even the Supreme Court has artfully evaded the issue of limiting the
"seize-run-sue" syndrome. In each of the four child custody cases it has
entertained, 90 the Court has declined to meet this problem squarely. Thus,
contesting parents are still able to capitalize on the federal character of
our nation as they vie for control of their child. They are aided by the
inapplicability of res judicata in awards of child custody9' and the fact
89. See Shapero v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); cf. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330 (1972); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); Aptheker v. Sec. of State, 378 U.S.
500 (1964); Dayton v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 144 (1958); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958);
Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270 (1900); Crandall
v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35 (1868); Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283 (1849). For a comprehensive
review of these cases see Hoffman, Restrictions on a Parents' Right to Travel in Child
Custody Cases: Possible Constitutional Questions, 6 U.C.D. L. REV. 181 (1973).
90. Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187 (1962); Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604 (1958); May v.
Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953); New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947).
91. New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947).
that, under full faith and credit, a sister state is required to give an
adjudication no more effect than it would be given by the rendering
forum.
In an effort to deal with this problem, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted and the ABA approved
the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act in 1968.92 This Act is
designed to alleviate the plight of children who are the subjects of
multi-jurisdictional custody cases. The basic purposes of the Act include
the discouragement of continued controversies over child custody to
establish a stable environment for the child, the deterrence of child
abductions and similar practices, and the promotion of interstate judicial
cooperation in child custody cases.
The Act achieves these objectives by providing that one court of a
single state shall assume responsibility for the custody of a particular
child. The properly chosen court will have access to as much relevant
information about the child and family as possible. Thus, jurisdiction
attaches if:
(a) the court is located in the "home state" of the child (as
defined); or,
(b) it is in the best interests of the child that the court assume
jurisdiction, because the child and at least one contestant
have significant contact with the state and substantial evi-
dence of the child's future prospects is available in the
state; or,
(c) the state had been the child's "home state" within six
months before the commencement of the proceeding, and
the child is absent from the state because of his/her remov-
al or retention by a person claiming his/her custody, and
the parent continues to live in the state.93
Once the proper forum is identified, the Act states that other essen-
tial evidence that may be located out-of-state shall be channeled into the
chosen court to aid in its adjudication. Thus, the court that hears the case
is authorized to obtain any essential evidence by ordering testimony and
records from courts in other jurisdictions.
The courts of other states must honor the decision of the custody
court and enforce it within their territory. If the state that originally heard
the case ceases to be a proper forum because the child has become
established in a new jurisdiction, a new court has the right to take
jurisdiction for purposes of modifications. All previously developed in-
formation and records will be channeled from the prior to the subsequent
court. So long as jurisdictional requirements are satisfied, the power to
modify a decree remains in the court that rendered the prior decree.
Although the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act codifies, to a
degree, the concepts of resjudicata and full faith and credit developed by
92. 9 U.L.A. 103 (1973).
93. See id. at 106 (1973).
case law, its emphasis upon encouraging the universal recognition of
sister states' decrees constitutes a major advancement. The tendency of
state courts, in contrast, has been to permit contestants to sue in their
home state, to freely modify custody decrees of other states, and thereby
to compete -with other jurisdictions. 94 Thus, the Act deserves careful




Today, the public is focusing even more on domestic relations law
and is finding it a very complex realm that is less easily integrated than
other areas of the law. Although most custody determinations upon
divorce are consensual and incidental to the resolution of the marital
conflict, there are many contested custody cases that require the court's
attention. Those circumstances upon which the courts focus in reaching a
child custody determination have been long in the making and their
evolution is not yet complete. The now recognized "best interests of the
child" standard has required the law to relinquish the old sex-related
presumptions favoring one spouse and to replace them with legal con-
cepts designed to place both parents on equal legal footing.
Just as time and experience have given us the "best interests of the
child" concept with all of its intricately balanced considerations, time
and experience will provide a polish to the current considerations of child
representation by counsel and development of a uniform system of cus-
tody jurisdiction statutes.
The courts must remain receptive to new and creative concepts and
constantly seek out the merits of new arguments. Similarly, it is incum-
bent upon attorneys to continually search for new approaches to tradition-
al problems and apply them to appropriate cases. With such perceptive-
ness and creativity, the legal community can hone from Solomon's Sword
a sharp, precisely balanced scalpel, which, when properly utilized, can
separate the relevant from the irrelevant, section out the biases, and
disclose, on a case-by-case basis, the true "best interests" of the subject
child. 96
94. See Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 16 Family Law Newsletter, no. 4, at
6 (Spring, 1976).
95. The Act has been enacted into law in California, Colorado, Hawaii, Oregon,
Wyoming, North Dakota, Maryland and Michigan.
96. Although this article has restricted its coverage to cases in which natural parents
vie for custody, it is noteworthy that in cases involving both natural and foster parents
selected by the Child Welfare Agency and the Juvenile Court under the theory that the child
is deprived as defined by the Juvenile Court Act, Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1464, No.
333, 11 PA. CONS. STAT. § 50-101 et seq., the "best interests" concept requires that the child
not be taken from the parents except upon proof of "clear necessity." "Best interest" is a
general welfare standard and is by definition a much less exacting standard than "clear
necessity." See In the Interest of James and John LaRue, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 366 A.2d
1271 (1976).
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